Expert: Putin's death would not change Russia's course or war

Even the death or overthrow of Vladimir Putin would not necessarily change Russia's course, says Polish journalist and writer Kuba Benedyczak. In an interview published after the Czech edition of his book “Diagnosis: Russia,” he explains that the war is too firmly bound up with the interests of powerful people, the economy and the country's idea of its place in the world.

Empire as a “cocaine” for society

Benedyczak is a Polish analyst, a lecturer at the University of Warsaw and a former staff member of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. He studies Russia's social and political situation, has worked there and traveled to the country regularly. “Diagnosis: Russia” came out in Czech in the autumn of 2026.

The roots of the problem, he says, run much deeper than the current regime. He compares Russian imperialism to “imperial cocaine”: it gives society a sense of greatness and strength and helps mask its own complexes. The effect is short-lived, so a new “dose” is always needed — the conquests of Georgia, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Chechnya. Rulers find it easy to feed such a society exactly that.

The author does not want to explain Russians' views by propaganda alone. It works effectively, he admits, but in Russia the state, television, military schools and the upbringing of an entire generation have come together: ten-year-old children are already growing up and thinking in terms of Putin's version of history. This, he believes, is social engineering on a vast scale, and the elites are being renewed with people who fought at the front.

A cult of violence, death and suffering

Another key to understanding the country is the literature of Fyodor Dostoevsky. Benedyczak stresses that he does not dispute the writer's greatness, but finds imperialism, a cult of suffering and a cult of death for the sake of the homeland in his books. Among the values of modern Russia he lists violence, stereotypical roles for men and women, and a readiness to die for the fatherland.

He has also noticed apathy: many Russians are convinced that “everything depends on the people in the Kremlin” and that they cannot influence what happens. In his view, this is a kind of defense mechanism against the cruelty of the state. He sensed a change on his last visit to Russia, in 2019, after the poisoning of Alexei Navalny: people had begun to watch every word they said.

Why nothing would change without Putin

In Central Europe many people think Russia would change once Putin dies. Benedyczak disagrees and gives two reasons. First, among the current leaders he sees no one willing to give up the course of war and military production: too many influential people have a stake in it. A truce, in his view, would only let Russia strengthen its economy and army and then move on, possibly toward Kyiv.

Second, he cannot imagine a new leader who would admit guilt to Ukrainians and pay for what was done: within this system of coordinates, that would be seen as weakness. Besides, Russia has a war economy, and stopping the war would mean high unemployment and factory closures. So far the problem of returning veterans has been kept under control, because the fighting at the front is done mostly by people from poor regions, such as Yakutia.

Benedyczak considers the Russian opposition weak and little known to ordinary Russians, so, he says, partners for negotiations have to be sought inside the regime itself. Western Europe, in his opinion, does not so much fail to understand Russia as want its business back: a market of 146 million consumers and cheap oil and gas attract Austrian, German, Italian and Dutch companies.

Around Prague, based on reporting by seznamzpravy.cz